Joint Liability Lending and the Rise and Fall of China's Township and Village Enterprises by Park, Albert & Shen, Minggao
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Liability Lending and the Rise and Fall 
 of China’s Township and Village Enterprises 
 
By: Albert Park and Minggao Shen 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 462 
July 2001 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Development Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Liability Lending and the Rise and Fall 
 of China’s Township and Village Enterprises* 
 
Albert Park 
Department of Economics and William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan 
 
 Minggao Shen 
Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology 
July 2001 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
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in southern China, we present a new explanation for the rise and fall of collectively-owned 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) based on the willingness of banks to finance 
collective enterprise development.  Until recently bank loans to TVEs exhibited the key 
features of joint liability lending, supported by the unique sanctioning ability of local leaders.  
Beginning in the mid 1990s, liquidation costs fell, firm performance deteriorated, real 
interest rates rose, and financial competition increased.  These changes led to a dramatic 
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Joint Liability Lending and the Rise and Fall of China’s Township and  
Village Enterprises 
 
1. Introduction 
The success of China’s township and village enterprises (TVEs) is one of the most 
unique institutional features of China’s economic transition.  Nationally, output of TVEs, 
defined as all rural collectively-owned enterprises, grew more than six-fold in real terms 
between 1985 and 1997, leading China’s rapid industrial and overall growth (Table 1).  An 
equally remarkable recent trend has been the rapid privatization of these same enterprises 
since the mid-1990s.  According to surveys conducted by the authors in the areas of greatest 
TVE success, Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces on China’s southeast coast, in 1998, the 
percentage of township-level enterprises that were collectively owned fell from 78 percent at 
year-end 1994 to 43 percent at the end of 1997, with a similar fall in the share of output 
value.   
In this paper, we present an explanation for the rise and fall of TVEs based on the 
willingness of banks to finance collective enterprise development.
1  Our main insight is that 
until recently bank loans to TVEs exhibited the key features of joint liability lending, which 
facilitated the provision of formal credit to finance the rapid expansion of TVEs.  Under 
joint liability, members of a group are held mutually responsible for repaying individual loans 
made to group members.  As a prominent feature of successful microfinance institutions 
worldwide, joint liability lending is normally associated with poor rural households in 
developing countries (e.g., Grameen Bank), and is credited with enabling the poor to access 
credit despite the lack of collateral associated with low wealth.  In China, the inability to 
collateralize loans was due to an undeveloped legal system and political obstacles to seizing 
publicly-owned assets.   
Surprisingly, however, this lack of collateral did not stop banks from lending to rural 
enterprises.  The share of total rural lending by state financial institutions to TVEs expanded 
steadily from 17 percent in 1985 to 32 percent in 1994 (Table 1).  By contrast, in many 
developing countries, small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) similar to China’s TVEs 
have been neglected by formal financial institutions.  In Taiwan, for example, where like 
                                                 
1 Most explanations for TVE success focus on the importance of local leaders to firm success when markets 
are imperfect and contracts are not easily enforced.  Government leaders provide scarce management skills, 
access to state-allocated inputs such as energy or intermediate inputs, facilitate output sales to the state sector, 
and protect firms from political risks (Che and Qian, 1998; Chen and Rozelle, 1999; Li, 1996). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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China rural enterprises led industrial expansion, SMEs relied primarily on the informal curb 
market (Biggs, 1991; Wade, 1990).
2 
Joint liability lending relies on the local information and the monitoring and 
sanctioning ability of borrowers to overcome problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and strategic default that frequently plague bank lending when collateral is absent.  Social 
sanctions can be effective punishments even in a one-shot game.  Dynamic incentives, i.e., 
the threat to cut off future lending, can help make sanctions credible and provide positive 
incentives for loan repayment.  Joint liability lending is not commonly observed among firm 
groups because the ability of firms to sanction each other is limited in commercial systems.  
Firms often prefer individual loans secured through other means (e.g., collateral) to joint 
liability contracts in which they bear greater monitoring and enforcement costs.  Unlike poor 
households, firms are more likely to have assets that can be collateralized.   
However, in China community enterprise ownership uniquely facilitated sanctioning 
in a way that would not have been possible had firms been privately owned.  Managers of 
collective firms are appointed by local government leaders, who as insiders monitor closely 
firm decision-making.  Because most township enterprise managers are native local residents, 
they often have well-developed personal relationships with local government officials and 
depend on officials’ support for career promotions.  Local government officials thus have 
the information and sanctioning ability to make joint liability lending contracts credible.  
They often explicitly or implicitly guaranteed loans in lieu of collateral, so that enterprises 
owned by the same local government (or community) became jointly liable for loans to 
individual enterprises.  There are numerous accounts of collective enterprises pooling funds 
to repay loans (tongshou huandai), assuming the debts of other enterprises that under-
performed or went bankrupt, or accumulating triangular debts among firms through 
accounts payable (Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2000).  Banks became willing partners in such lending 
arrangements. 
The success of joint liability lending also requires other favorable conditions.  First, 
greater firm profitability reduces the probability of coordinated strategic default and can 
enhance the value of joint liability in reducing moral hazard.  These arguments are developed 
in greater detail below.  In China, TVEs were highly profitable during the early reform 
                                                 
2 Informal financing is also important in China (Tsai, 1999; Whiting, 2000), but the Chinese government has 
actively suppressed informal institutions that reach a large scale.  For example, Rural Cooperative Foundations, 
rapidly growing alternative credit organizations in many parts of China, were shut down in 1999. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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period, filling market demand niches not met by the state-owned sector and taking advantage 
of rising demand associated with rapid income growth.  Low real interest rates also made 
repayment easier, supporting joint liability lending.  In addition, bank competition can 
undermine dynamic incentives by raising the possibility that defaulters can find new lenders, 
especially if information systems that share credit histories are not well-developed.  During 
the early reform period, local lending to TVEs was dominated by Rural Credit Cooperatives 
and Agricultural Bank local branches, which often coordinated decisions and so could 
exploit market power (Whiting, 2000).   
Beginning in the mid 1990s, a number of changes harmed the environment for joint 
liability lending.  First, liquidation costs fell, making lawsuits more common and collateral a 
more efficient way to secure loans, especially for private firms.  Second, firm performance 
deteriorated as the overall economy slowed, product market competition intensified, and the 
advantages of local leader involvement in TVE management declined while the incentive 
problems of public ownership became more apparent.  Third, real interest rates shot up as 
inflation came down but nominal rates adjusted slowly.  Fourth, financial competition 
increased.  In 1996 Rural Credit Cooperatives were separated from the Agricultural Bank of 
China and began competing directly.  The government also encouraged state specialized 
banks to compete across sectors, which in many areas sharply increased competition for 
TVE borrowers.  Together, these changes led to a dramatic change in the lending 
preferences of banks in favor of private firms.  Whereas in 1994, nearly all bank managers 
favored lending to collective firms ceteris paribus, by 1997 only 14 percent favored collective 
firms while 58 percent favored private firms.  We conjecture that the changing attitude of 
banks was a key factor in the rapid privatization of TVEs that occurred during the mid-
1990s. 
Our interpretation of the role of optimal loan contracting contrasts with the 
conventional view of the role of local leaders in facilitating credit access for TVEs, which 
emphasizes the ability of local leaders to exert political influence on bank managers and 
mobilize more collateral than private firms (since many assets such as land and equipment 
are publicly owned).
3  While recognizing the important influence of local political factors in 
lending decisions, we argue that bankers cared about loan repayment, and rather than being 
                                                 
3 This point is made by Che and Qian (1998).  This paper builds upon their important insight that collective 
ownership redefines the boundaries of the firm, and their emphasis on the role played by local leaders.   
However, we take a different view on the role of collateral. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
  4 
arm-twisted into making loans to TVEs, themselves preferred lending to collective 
enterprises with joint liability.  In addition, collective ownership made it more not less 
difficult to collateralize loans, because seizing community assets was extremely difficult and 
costly in practice. 
We develop our argument both theoretically and empirically.  In section 2, we 
introduce the survey data collected from financial institutions, enterprise managers, and 
township leaders in Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces in southern China.  In section 3, we 
describe joint liability lending to TVEs in rural China, and introduce the institutional context 
for such lending.  In section 4, we extend theoretical models from the microfinance literature 
to derive propositions for how the institutional and economic environment affects the 
relative profitability of joint liability versus individual lending.  In section 5, we use the 
survey data and other sources to provide empirical support for our interpretation of the rise 
and fall of joint liability lending in rural China.  In section 6, in order to test the propositions, 
we estimate empirical specifications of the determinants of bank lending preferences, the 
role of township leaders in organizing loan application meetings, and the effect of other 
firms’ profitability on the ability of collective firms to obtain loans.  A final section 
concludes, contrasting our explanation with conventional interpretations.   
 
2. Data 
We utilize data from a survey conducted in the summer of 1998 by the authors in 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces, two affluent provinces on China’s southern coast.  The 
survey included questionnaires for all three actors involved in TVE lending--bank managers, 
local government (township) leaders, and firm managers in 60 townships. 
We conducted surveys in 15 counties--8 in Jiangsu and 7 in Zhejiang.  The two 
provinces were chosen because of their highly developed rural industry, which together 
accounted for 24.1 percent of China’s total TVE income in 1997, and because TVEs in these 
areas experienced rapid privatization during the mid-1990s.  The provinces contain both 
well-developed and under-developed regions, providing substantial spatial variation in levels 
of economic and institutional development.  All the counties were randomly sampled based 
on stratification by region and industrial development (measured by industrial output per William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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capita).
4  Four sample townships in each county were randomly selected stratifying again by 
industrial output per capita in 1997.  Government officials and managers from 59 townships, 
57 ABC local branches and 58 RCCs were interviewed.  We also randomly selected three 
firms in each township from a census of all firms that existed in 1994 provided by local 
government officials.  We focused on township-run enterprises and private enterprises in 
township seats, rather than village enterprises.
5  The census data provide useful summary 
data on ownership change, profits, and production output of each enterprise, facilitating 
construction of township indices of firm performance.  A total of 177 firms were surveyed, 
137 of which were customers of ABC local branches or RCCs, or both. 
 
3. Joint Liability Lending to China’s Township and Village Enterprises 
Unlike many developing countries where small- and medium-scale firms have 
difficulty obtaining formal bank loans, in China state banks have played a major role in 
financing collective enterprise development.  As described earlier, bank lending to TVEs and 
the share of TVE lending in total rural lending grew substantially from 1985 to 1994 (Table 
1).
6  Almost all rural enterprise lending went to TVEs, with relatively faster growth in lending 
to private firms occurring beginning in the early 1990s.  During the early reform period, 
private firms complained about lack of credit access and bankers admitted enforcing stricter 
standards for collateral and guarantors and being less willing to lend to private firms (Oi, 
1999; Whiting, 2000).  In 1985, bank lending to private enterprises was only 2.8 billion yuan 
while lending to township enterprises was 20.1 billion yuan and to village enterprises 5.9 
billion yuan.  From 1985 to 1990, growth in lending was similar for private and collective 
enterprises, but from 1990 to 1995, private loans increased by more than 40 percent 
compared to less than 30 percent for collective enterprises (Oi, 1999).  Despite this 
improvement in the willingness to lend to private enterprises, financial institutions continued 
                                                 
4 According to the economic regions, we grouped all counties in Jiangsu province into three categories: most 
advanced area, medium advanced area, and less advanced area but in Zhejiang province counties were only 
divided into two categories: most advanced area and less advanced area.  We then divided each area into sub-
groups by industrial output per capita in 1997.  Finally, from each sub-group, we randomly selected one sample 
county.  8 counties in Jiangsu and 7 counties in Zhejiang were finally surveyed. 
5 We believe that village enterprises are organized and functioning more like private enterprises.  In contrast to 
township officials, village leaders are less influential on bank decisions.  It is another potential topic to examine 
how township enterprises and village enterprises respond differently toward the decentralization, but to do so 
is out of the scope of the current research.  
6 These growth rates were uneven over time, with periods of rapid growth occurring during 1984-87 and 1990-
93 and slow to no growth occurring during 1988-89 and since 1994. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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to lend primarily to TVEs.  In 1997, loans to rural collective enterprises accounted for 84.7 
percent of total rural enterprise loans (XZQYNJ, 1998).  
  Lending financed a large share of TVE investments in fixed assets, especially in the 
early reform period.  National statistics report that bank financing of TVE fixed capital 
formation was 37.4 percent in 1989,  40.5 percent in 1991, and 28.2 percent in 1994 
(XZQYNJ, 1995).
7  Many TVE loans also provided working capital, and increasingly so over 
time.
8  In our sample of firms in 1997, the majority of both working capital debts and long-
term debts were from bank loans. 
Collective ownership means that all land and assets are owned by all of the citizens 
of a township or village, but in practice the resources are controlled by local government 
officials.  Institutionally, local government leaders can play many roles in furthering the 
development of collective enterprises.  At one extreme, leaders manage the enterprises 
directly, with all profits accruing to the local government.  Multiple enterprises may be 
managed as a multi-division corporation (Che and Qian, 1998; Oi, 1992).  At the other 
extreme, governments sign fixed-rent contracts with managers who become full residual 
claimants and retain nearly all control rights.  Over time, there has been a steady shift to 
more decentralized management structures (Chen and Rozelle, 1999; Chen, 2000).  
Regardless of the specific arrangement, firms in the community share common ownership, 
and most firm managers come from the local community.  Many managers are current or 
former government officials, and nearly all have close ties to local government leaders.  
Local government officials maintain appointment power over firm managers and can 
influence their promotion to other leadership positions.  Even when control is decentralized, 
this gives government leaders sufficient leverage to enforce compliance with joint liability 
payments.   
There are numerous accounts of joint liability in TVE credit contracts. Oi (1999) 
writes that “Township and village officials redistributed income and debt among sectors and 
enterprises within their corporate community” and “the collective—that is, the township or 
village as a collective entity—bore the risks” (p.70).  She adds, “Interviewees from a number 
of localities stated that when a collective enterprise failed and defaulted on its loans, the debt 
                                                 
7 Other TVE studies find similar results.  Zhou, Qiu, and Hu (1987) report 48 percent for 200 TVEs in 10 
provinces during 1984-86 (and 45.5 percent of initial investments), Ody (1992) reports 32-38 percent during 
1986-88, Chen (2000) reports average rates above 50 percent for 64 firms in 4 provinces in 1994. 
8 Working capital loans for small and medium sized firms are viewed by banks as being risky.  In the U.S., 
nearly all small business loans, including for working capital, are secured by capital (Berger and Udell, 1998). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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was paid off by the remaining solvent collective enterprises”  “These firms paid, however, 
grudgingly, because their own future depended on the goodwill of the local authorities who 
controlled credit and investment opportunities.” (p.71).  Byrd (1990) describes the 
community government’s ability to “spread risk across its enterprises to increase the 
flexibility and ability to absorb losses of any one firm.”  Similar accounts are offered by Wu 
(1993), Whiting (2000), and interviewed bank managers in the study areas in Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang.  In many cases local government agencies such as township economic 
commissions or public finance bureaus acted as offical loan guarantors (Oi, 1999; Whiting, 
2000).  Our survey finds that in 1994 two thirds of local governments acted as guarantors for 
at least some TVE loans, and 42 percent of loans on average.  For new loans granted in 1997 
and secured by guarantors, 41.7 percent of ABC loans and 53.1 percent of RCC loans were 
secured by local governments, the rest by other township-owned enterprises.  Our firm 
survey reveals that for nearly 100 percent of borrowing firms whose loans are secured by 
guarantors in 1994 and 1997, the guarantor was either the township government or a 
township-run enterprise (Table 2).  Private firms generally were not qualified guarantors.  
Firms also commonly accumulated “triangular” debts through accounts payable. 
  The survey also finds that township leaders played an active role in loan applications 
and in ensuring repayment of loans, but that this involvement declined significantly from 
1994 to 1997.  In 1994, about 70 percent of township leaders organized loan application 
meetings to bring lenders and borrowers together.  On average, each township government 
organized 2.6 such meetings during the year (Table 2).  In 1997, only 50 percent organized 
meetings, and the average number of such meetings dropped to 1.6.  Similarly, over the same 
period the average number of repayment meetings organized by township leaders declined 
from 1.3 to 0.6.  Visits between bank managers and local leaders were frequent, averaging 
37.4 visits in 1994, but falling to 19.3 in 1997.  In 1997, the majority of bank managers 
reported that they would seek assistance from township leaders for loan repayment if loans 
were overdue.  Also, 57 percent of bank managers reported that in 1990 government 
assistance in repaying loans after a collective firm shut down was likely or possible; the 
percentage fell to 41 percent in 1994 and only 24 percent in 1997. 
 
4. Theory 
  Joint liability lending arises when conventional methods for securing loans fail, in 
particular when borrowers are unable to provide collateral.  Programs based on this principle William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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have been widely touted for facilitating credit access for poor households in both developed 
and developing countries.  Unlike individual loans, joint liability gives group members an 
incentive to select credit-worthy members, monitor the project selection and effort level of 
members, and sanction members that default without cause.  Thus, the effectiveness of such 
arrangements depends on the quality of information borrowers have about fellow group 
members and their ability to punish members with social sanctions. 
Joint liability helps address the main problems faced by formal credit institutions—
adverse selection, moral hazard, and enforcement (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Morduch, 
1999).  Models of adverse selection in microfinance programs show that borrowers will sort 
into groups that include members with projects of similar riskiness.  Safe borrowers value 
other safe borrowers more than risky borrowers because of the greater likelihood of being in 
a position to repay on behalf of others.  Banks can exploit this by offering different lending 
terms to different groups, and thus increase profits.  Joint liability reduces moral hazard if 
borrowers can decide on projects cooperatively and internalize the positive externality their 
own effort level has on the effort incentives of others.  The externality is introduced by joint 
liability because greater effort reduces the likelihood that other members will have to repay 
one’s loan, increasing the return to effort of other borrowers.  In an application of this idea 
to China’s TVEs, Zou and Sun (2000) show that risk pooling can increase the frequency of 
efficient liquidation of firms.  Finally, joint liability reduces defaults by firms with poor 
projects, when better-performing firms are willing and able to pay on their behalf.  This is 
true especially if social sanctions prevent solvent firms from strategically defaulting when 
other group members are unable to repay loans. 
Although we use the term joint liability to describe TVE loans, the loan contracts are 
typically individual loans that do not explicitly define the full set of obligations of other 
firms, a set of contingencies which would be very costly to write.  Joint liability is not 
contracted legally except to the extent that township governments and other collective firms 
act as loan guarantors on individual loan contracts.  However, unlike individual loans to 
farmers in a village, when lending to collective enterprises, banks can identify all group 
members and so can enforce implicit joint liability.  Bank managers consider loans to 
individual collective firms to be loans to the collective as a whole.
9 
                                                 
9 Rai and Sjostrom (2000) show that as long as members can enforce side contracts, agreed upon transfers in a 
system of individual loans will maximize joint surplus and be identical to those that occur when joint liability is William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Below, we present a set of propositions for how different characteristics of the local 
lending environment are expected to affect the relative profitability of joint-liability lending 
to collective firms compared to individual lending to private firms.  In the propositions, we 
refer to this comparison as simply the relative profitability of joint liability lending.  We assume that 
it is more difficult to seize collateral from collective firms.  Because we believe that joint 
liability is implicit in collective ownership, we exclude the possibility of individual loans to 
collective firms.  The theoretical microfinance literature has identified multiple mechanisms 
for how joint liability might improve loan performance for banks and increase the welfare of 
borrowers.  Adapting results from this literature to reflect the Chinese institutional 
environment, we offer six propositions that form the basis of the later discussion and 
empirical tests.  To fix some of these ideas formally, we extend Ghatak and Guinnane’s 
moral hazard model and Besley and Coate’s strategic default model and derive proofs of 
many of the propositions, which are presented in the appendices. 
 
Proposition 1.  Greater ability to seize private versus collective collateral reduces the relative profitability of 
joint liability lending.  
  Greater ability to seize collateral priveleges lending to private firms over collective 
firms ceteris paribus.  Collateral helps solve adverse selection, moral hazard, and enforcement 
problems, and so reduces the need for joint liability lending.  For proof using a strategic 
default model, please see Appendix 2.  
  
Proposition 2.  Greater sanctioning ability increases the relative profitability of joint liability lending.  
  Nearly all models of joint liability implicitly assume that groups can enforce 
agreements internally through the threat of social sanctions.  This is true for adverse 
selection models that predict positive assortative matching of borrower types (Ghatak, 1998; 
Van Tassel, 1998) as well as moral hazard models (Stilglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Conning, 
1996; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1998).  In their enforcement model, Besley and Coate (1995) 
prove that the repayment rate under joint liability lending exceeds that under individual 
lending for sufficiently large social sanctions (Proposition 3, p.12).  Thus, through all of 
                                                                                                                                                 
legally contracted.  If one treats loans as individual loans, banks will favor firms that have enforceable side 
contracts that recreate the transfers made under joint liability lending. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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these mechanisms, greater sanctioning ability improves the performance of joint liability 
loans while having no benefit for individual lending. 
 
Proposition 3.  Lower firm profitability reduces the relative profitability of joint liability lending. 
This proposition holds for both the moral hazard model and, under reasonable 
assumptions, the strategic default model of joint liability.  With moral hazard, optimal 
borrower effort can be increased with joint liability lending if group members are able to 
decide on projects cooperatively  (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1998).  This enables group 
members to internalize the effects of their own effort on the expected payoffs to other 
borrowers in the group.  Effort is proportional to expected profit if the firm’s project is 
successful, so lower firm profitability reduces effort regardless of whether the loan includes 
joint liability.   This reduces the effort difference, or advantage, associated with joint liability 
lending.  See Appendix 1 for a formal proof. 
In the strategic default model, lower expected profitability of firms reduces the 
relative profitability of joint liability lending as long as the distribution of firm types is such 
that a decline in average profitability leads to a decreased probability of high type firms 
relative to medium type firms.  Following Besley and Coate (1995), high types are defined as 
those firms capable of repaying both their own loan and the other firm’s defaulted loan, 
medium types are those capable of repaying their own loan but not other loans, and low 
types are those that cannot repay even their own loan.  In two-person groups, joint liability 
reduces defaults when high types are paired with low types, since both loans are repaid, but 
increases defaults when medium types are paired with low types, because medium types 
strategically default.  Thus, more high types relative to medium types increases the 
desirability of joint liability lending.  Put more intuitively, a decline in overall performance 
makes joint liability less desirable if it becomes relatively more difficult to find highly 
profitable firms that can effectively secure loans in the case of default by other group 
members.  One distribution that meets this criteria is the uniform distribution.  See 
Appendix 2 for a formal proof of this result for the strategic default model. 
 
Proposition 4.  A higher interest rate reduces the relative profitability of joint liability lending. 
  The interest rate defines the threshold profitability level of firms that is necessary for 
successful loan repayment.  An increase in the interest rate thus has similar consequences for 
expected repayment rates as an across-the-board reduction in firm profitability.  Not William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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surprisingly, in both the moral hazard and strategic default models, the comparative static 
result for the interest rate is the opposite of that for expected firm profitability (see 
Appendices 1 and 2). 
 
Proposition 5.  Greater bank competition reduces the relative profitability of joint liability lending.   
  If dynamic incentives are important, they should be more important for lending to 
collective firms than to private firms since loans to private firms can be partly collateralized 
by assumption.  Competition undermines dynamic incentives by increasing the likelihood 
that borrowers can switch to other banks in the event of default, rendering ineffective the 
threat of withholding future lending.  This should have a relatively stronger impact on 
lending to collective firms.  See Appendix 2 for proof. 
 
Proposition 6.  Larger group size increases the relative profitability of joint liability lending. 
Armendariz de Aghion (1999) shows that for a given interest rate, larger groups 
increase payoffs to banks by providing greater insurance against individual default.
10  
However, larger group also could undermine peer monitoring if it size is inversely related to 
the quality of information, increases monitoring costs, or undermines social sanctioning 
ability.  Despite the ambiguous direction of effects, for China’s TVEs, we expect the 
portfolio diversification effect of group size to dominate the effects on information and 
social sanctioning ability.  The number of collective firms in a township is usually not very 
large, and the sanctioning ability of township leaders relies on their institutional authority, 
and which is not diminished when there are more collective firms. 
 
5. Joint Liability Lending and the Rise and Fall of TVEs 
Our theory predicts that group lending is more desirable when collateral is 
unavailable, the ability to impose social sanctions is high, firm profitability is high, the 
interest rate is low, bank competition is limited, and groups are large.  Empirically, these 
factors will vary both over time and in cross-section.  In this section, we provide descriptive 
evidence to support our argument that joint liability lending can explain the major trends in 
TVE borrowing and performance over time.  We describe how during the mid-1990s 
collateral, firm profitability, interest rates, and competition all changed in ways our theory William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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tells us should undermine the relative profitability of joint liability lending versus individual, 
collateral-based lending.  We argue that these changes help explain the observed decline in 
the willingness of banks to lend to collectively-owned enterprises.   
Collateral 
At the outset of economic reform, collateral was difficult to liquidate and was rarely 
used.  Following three decades of collectivization, local governments controlled nearly all 
assets.  Land, for example, was and continues to be collectively owned.  Individuals or 
private firms lacked suitable assets for collateral.  Che and Qian (1998) argue that the larger 
value of collective assets facilitated greater collateralization of loans for TVEs, leading  
directly to greater credit financing by banks.  However, use of collective assets for collateral 
is problematic.  First, most collective assets are buildings or other fixed capital (Whiting, 
1996)
11 located in remote townships or villages; often the true market value of these assets is 
negligible.  Second and more importantly, it was costly for financial institutions to litigate 
against community governments, and with little likelihood of success.  According to our 
survey, 76.2 percent of bank managers report that it is easier to liquidate private assets than 
collective assets.  Only 8.3 percent say that it is easier to liquidate collective assets.  This may 
help explain why in 1997, even though private firms performed better on average than 
collective firms, the frequency of lawsuits against the former was twice that of the latter 
(Table 3).  Whiting (2000) also describes the “unwillingness or ability of courts to enforce 
rulings against the interests of local state officials.” 
Because of its ineffectiveness, until recently few bank managers emphasized the 
importance of collateral in making lending decisions.  The word collateral did not even 
appear in ABC documents until 1985.  At that time, branches were required to reduce the 
amount of unsecured loans, but without clear guidelines on which loans should be 
collateralized, how collateral should be valued, or which types of collateral and guarantees 
were acceptable.  Even when collateral requirements became more common in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, the true value of collateral was often unclear.  Collateral value was 
frequently overestimated, for example by using purchase rather than market values (Whiting, 
1996).  Ownership of collateral assets was often poorly defined, and the ability to seize assets 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 This result assumes that the magnitude of social sanctions that can be imposed does not decline with group 
size. 
11 Our survey finds that even in 1997, more than 50 percent of collateral was buildings. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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remained uncertain.  Eighty-five percent of surveyed county bank branch managers reported 
that collateral was not used in lending prior to 1993. 
Although these problems remain pervasive, recently the ability and willingness of 
banks to secure loans with collateral has increased.  Our firm survey shows that TVE loans 
secured by collateral increased from 30.1 percent in 1994 to 45.8 percent in 1997 while 
private firm loans guaranteed by collateral surged from 6.3 percent in 1994 (when very few 
townships even had private enterprises) to 52.7 percent in 1997 (Table 3).  From 1994 to 
1997, the frequency of lawsuits against collective firms tripled and those against private firms 
increased by five times (Table 3).  Nationally, court litigation over economic disputes (of 
which lending contracts account for over one third) increased 2.5 times from 1990 to 1997 
(Law Yearbook of China, 1991 and 1997).  The Law of Guarantees (danbaofa) enacted in 1995 
defined acceptable types of collateral and outlined procedures for evaluating the value of and 
liquidating collateral.  Nonetheless, by 1998 seventy percent of bank managers still felt that 
high liquidation costs remain a significant problem.
12 
Firm Profitability 
After 1993, the profitability of township and village enterprises in China fell 
gradually.  Table 1 shows that the ratio of total profits over total revenue of TVEs declined 
steadily from 9.4 percent in 1985 to 1.9 percent in 1997.  Also, reflecting the increasing 
competition, the profitability of private firms followed the same pattern, but overall private 
firms had much higher ratios of profits to revenue.  Oi (1999) reports that deficits of 
township enterprises increased from 0.5 billion yuan in 1985 to 3.8 billion yuan in 1990 to 
12.6 billion yuan in 1995.  The survey data also reveal a decline in rural enterprise 
profitability for all ownership types.  The percentage of firms in the sample townships which 
were profitable fell from 75.9 percent in 1994 to 67.5 percent in 1996, rising slightly to 70.9 
percent in 1997; mean profits as a share of income fell from 2.5 percent to –1.7 percent over 
the same period.  The fall was much sharper for collective enterprises, whether we look at 
firms that started as collective in 1994 or look at current ownership status (Table 4).  Private 
enterprises, on the other hand, are more profitable than collective firms in all years, whether 
or not one includes newly privatized firms.  Changing relative profitability of collective and 
                                                 
12 The survey finds that in 1997, it took about five months to conclude a case with costs equal to 4.3 percent of 
the loan amount.  The likelihood of winning lawsuits was 94 percent, and winning lawsuits returned 45 percent 
of the disputed loan amount on average.  Allowing for interest costs of 5 percent of the loan (for five months), 
this suggests an expected loan recovery rate of 33 percent of the loan value.  However, it reflects positive 
selection bias since banks will not sue if expected returns are too low. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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private firms itself cannot explain the shift in lending preferences of bank managers ceteris 
paribus, because the question controls for profitability differences. 
  A number of factors help explain the declining profitability of collective firms, both 
overall and in comparison to private firms.  First, increased competition may have eroded 
profitability.  Second, market development may have eroded efficiency advantages of 
collective ownership since private firms can get everything they need from the market but do 
not have incentive problems associated with public ownership (Chen and Rozelle, 1999).  
Third, as argued earlier, reductions in joint liability lending may have increased adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, reducing firm efficiency.  Fourth, the tight credit 
retrenchment policies after perceived excessive lending following Deng’s southern tour in 
1992 may have cut off credit access to the non-state sector, adversely affecting enterprises.  
Finally, falling profitability may be due simply to lack of demand during a period of slow 
growth.   
Interest Rates 
  The interest rate level has a direct effect on the ability and incentive to repay loans 
and so can have a large effect on bank lending preferences.  In 1997, the average interest rate 
for six-month loans was 8.58 percent for ABC local branches and 10.23 for RCCs, with 
standard deviations of 0.46 and 0.42.  Real interest rates have varied significantly over time, 
mainly because nominal rates do not respond much to inflation.  From 1994 to 1997, the 
real interest rate increased substantially, from –13.1 percent to 5.8 percent.   
Bank Competition 
China began decentralizing its monobank system in 1984 when it established an 
independent central bank (the Peoples Bank of China) and four specialized banks 
(Agricultural Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank, Construction Bank, and the Bank of 
China).  The specialized banks were granted greater autonomy and encouraged to become 
commercial lenders, but they maintained monopoly power in their sectors of operation and 
were still responsible for policy lending.  The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was 
responsible for lending to support agriculture and rural development.  Although Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs) were officially recognized as collectively-run financial institutions, they 
in fact were closely supervised by ABC local branches, so that the two essentially acted as a William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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single unit (Xu, 1996).
13  With a few exceptions, this relationship remained unchanged 
throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
In the mid-1990s, several important changes furthered financial decentralization in 
the rural financial sector.  First, in order to allow the ABC to become a true commercial 
bank, all of its policy lending responsibilities were shifted to the newly established 
Agricultural Development Bank of China in 1994.  Second, starting in 1994, RCCs became 
administratively independent from ABC local branches, and instead received financial 
supervision directly from the People’s Bank of China.
14  In addition, lending across sectors 
by all commercial banks was encouraged to promote competition.  Thus, the original mono-
bank system was replaced by an emerging competitive banking system (see also, Watson, 
1999; Oi, 1999).
15   
  The survey finds that in 1997, the lending market share of RCCs was 45.9 percent, 
followed by 32.4 percent for ABC local branches, and 21.7 percent for other financial 
institutions.  RCCs held 42.5 percent of deposits in 1997 and ABC local branches 34.7 
percent.  The percentage of firms banking exclusively with one rural financial institution was 
41 percent for collective firms and 62.3 percent for private firms.   
  
6.  Empirical Tests 
The previous section makes the argument that between 1994 and 1997, both rural 
financial and industrial sectors were experiencing transitions from a joint liability lending 
regime to a more decentralized one featuring individual lending.  However, there also was 
significant spatial variation in the speed of this transition.  In this section, we use cross-
sectional data to empirically test whether: 1) the determinants of the change in bank 
managers’ preferences to lend to collective versus private firms are consistent with our 
theoretical predictions; 2) township leaders are more involved in bank lending decisions in 
townships where joint liability lending is more advantageous to banks; and 3) when local 
banks prefer collective lending, collective firms are more likely to get loans if other collective 
                                                 
13 ABC local branches and RCCs were separable in terms of the employees and businesses, but the mangers of 
RCCs were often the same as the managers of ABC local branches.  It was up to the managers of ABC local 
branches to decide whether ABC local branches or RCCs conducted certain business.  In some provinces, 
RCCs and ABC local branches were even merged into one institution. 
14 In a few experimental sites, RCCs were separated from ABC local branches as early as the late 1980s. 
15 The survey finds that one quarter of townships have at least one state bank branch in addition to the ABC.  
Most of these banks are located in developed areas where more business opportunities exist.  Even when no 
other state bank branches are found, competition can come from branches located in nearby townships. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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firms in the township perform well.  In the absence of joint liability lending, only the firms 
own characteristics should affect its ability to obtain loans. 
The estimation results provide striking confirmation of the propositions presented in 
section 4.  Each of the main estimation results proves to be highly robust despite the small 
sample sizes.  Nonetheless, because of the small sample sizes and the cross-sectional nature 
of the data, which makes omitted variable bias a concern, the results should be interpreted 
cautiously. 
Lending Preferences 
The changing lending preferences of bank managers from 1994 and 1997 is striking.  
In 1994, virtually all bank managers favored lending to collective firms.  Only 9 percent 
preferred private firms.  However, by 1997, 58 percent preferred private firms.  Thus with a 
few exceptions, lending preferences in 1997 reflect the change in preferences from joint 
liability lending.
16  The lending preference variable can take three discrete values: 1 if the 
bank manager prefers to lend to collective firms, 2 if the manager has no clear preference, 
and 3 if the manager prefers private firms.   
To test the six propositions, we require measures of collateral (c), social sanctions (s), 
firm profitability (z), the interest rate (r), bank competition (m), and group size (n).  Our 
specification includes variables that measure each of these factors. 
A key assumption is that private firms can collateralize loans while collective firms 
cannot.  We thus need a measure of the relative ability of private firms to collateralize loans 
in comparison to collective firms rather than a measure of the overall ability of all firms to 
provide collateral for loans.  We use the response to the question “all things equal, for which 
type of firms is legal actions to recover loans more effective?”  The possible responses are 1 
if collective, 2 if neutral, and 3 if private. 
We use the share of collective firm managers born in the township as a measure of 
the ability to impose social sanctions.  Managers from the township are less mobile because 
they have close ties to the community, and are more likely to have career goals which depend 
on the support of local government leaders.  Our measure is calculated from the surveys of 
three firms in each township.  The surveys found that in 1994, 92 percent of township 
enterprise managers were born in the township and 37 percent were or had been local 
                                                 
16 Because the 1994 data is incomplete, we cannot construct a change variable for lending preferences.  In order 
to treat the 1997 preference as the change in preference, we drop the few observations in which bank managers 
prefer to lend to private firms in 1994.  Only three observations with complete data are dropped.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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government officials themselves (12 percent were current officials).  None of these 
characteristics had changed much by 1997.
17  We also tried other variables such as 
government leader characteristics, the turnover rate for government leaders, and whether 
firm managers are or have been government officials.  Township government surveys found 
that only 17.2 percent of government officials were born in the township.  There was 
substantial turnover in the leadership of local governments, reflecting the system of cadre 
rotation typical of most counties.  On average from 1992 to 1998, townships had 2.6 party 
secretaries and 2.7 mayors.  Thus it appears that township officials exhibited greater mobility 
than firm managers in practice.   
The distribution of township enterprise profitability is captured by the share of firms 
in the township that earn positive profits.  We use this rather than the average profitability of 
firms because theory suggests that joint liability lending should be affected more by the 
distribution than the mean of firm performance.  If firm ownership is endogenous to bank 
lending preferences, then our profitability measure should include all firms that could 
participate in joint liability lending contracts as collective firms.  However, originally private 
firms are never observed to be collectivized, except when they adopt a collective label, or 
“wear red hats” (dai hong maozi) but act as fully independent firms.  In our data, we categorize 
red hat firms as private.  In 1994, in most townships privatization had not begun, so that 
most private firms were likely to be originally private firms not “eligible” to be collective.  
Thus, our preferred profitability measure is the share of collective firms in 1994 that are 
profitable.  We also estimate a specification using data for all firms (rather than just collective 
firms) in 1994 in case many private firms were privatized rather than originally private, but 
this does not substantially alter our results (not reported). 
The interest rate is the annualized rate for six-month working capital loans.  
Although interest rates are still highly regulated in China, financial institutions can determine 
loan interest rates within a range set by the PBC.  We are concerned about possible 
endogeneity of the interest rate, because it complicates our interpretation of the relationship 
between interest rates and lending preferences.  In 1997, ABC branches could adjust interest 
rates within a 20 percent range and RCCs within a 40 percent range.  However, upper 
branches of the financial institutions, especially at the county level, circumscribe these bands.  
                                                 
17 Chen (2000) finds that among 64 township enterprise managers in four provinces surveyed in 1995, including 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, found that 86 percent were local residents and 75 percent were party members, 81 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Our survey of township bank branches finds almost no variation in loan or deposit interest 
rates within counties.  We thus assert that branch managers treat the interest rate as 
exogenous.  Of course, it is still possible that interest rates are endogenous at the county 
level, reflecting county level factors that also affect the relative profitability of joint liability 
lending.  However, to the extent that rural banks at the county level compete with other 
specialized banks (e.g., Industrial and Commercial Bank, Construction Bank, 
Communications Bank, Bank of China), the interest rate reflects the overall market 
conditions in multiple sectors, which arguably are relatively exogenous to firm performance 
and lending preferences of rural banks.  Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we specify a 
linear regression for lending preference and township leader loan involvement in which the 
real interest rate is instrumented using county deposits per capita (a measure of the supply of 
funds).  This turns out not to alter the results in any important way. 
  Our measure of financial competition is the share of outstanding loans from 
financial institutions other than the ABC and RCC.  We use the average of the two estimates 
of managers of ABC local branches and RCCs.  We focus on competition from institutions 
other than the ABC and RCC because we expect information sharing with such institutions 
to be particularly poor, and so to significantly undermine dynamic incentives. 
Group size is simply the number of enterprises in the township that can participate 
in joint liability lending, measured by the number of collective firms.  Because group size can 
change with privatization and so may be endogenous to lending preferences, our preferred 
specification uses the number of collective firms in 1994, before widespread privatization 
began. 
We specify the lending preference equation as an ordered probit model, with the 
1997 lending preference, equivalent to the change in preference, as the dependent variable.  
We define an unobserved latent preference variable y* to be a function of the six 
independent variables of interest and dummy variables for province and type of financial 
institution: 
 
  e b b b b b b b b b + + + + + + + + + = TYPE PROV n m r z s c y 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 *   (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
percent were appointed by local governments, 19 percent were previously Party cadres, and 36 and 33 percent 
were previous managers or employees of collective enterprises. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
  19 
We observe y=1 if y*£m1, y=2 if m1< y*£m2, and y=3 if y*>m2, where m1 and m2 are estimated 
cutoff values, assuming e is normally distributed. 
We estimate three versions of (1).  A main concern is the potential endogeneity of z 
and n to lending preferences since access to loans is likely to influence firm performance and 
the decision to privatize.  If joint liability lending increases profitability by reducing moral 
hazard, it will also induce a positive bias on the coefficient for firm profitability.  In 1994, we 
assume that all townships were in a joint liability lending equilibrium, all potential group 
members were collectivized, and all bank managers preferred lending to collective firms.  
Subsequently, many bank managers either became indifferent between private and collective 
lending or switched preferences to private firms.  Because firm performance and firm 
ownership is likely to be endogenous to lending preferences, for firm-related variables such 
as the share of firms that are profitability, managers from township, and group size, our 
preferred specification (column 1) uses “initial” 1994 variables.  Use of lagged variables can 
also be justified if preferences take time to adjust, so that the change in preference is a 
function of initial conditions.  Because the collateral variable has a large number of missing 
values, in the second specification, we drop the collateral variable, which increases our 
observations by one third.  The third specification ignores endogeneity concerns and looks 
at the relationship between 1997 lending preferences and 1997 collective firm characteristics.  
All estimations for both lending preferences and township leader involvement in lending 
allow for clustering at the county level in calculating standard errors. 
Coefficient estimates for the determinants of 1997 lending preferences are presented 
in Table 5.  We also report marginal effects on the likelihood of preferring lending to private 
firms versus being indifferent or preferring collective firms (Table 7).  All the signs are as the 
theory predicts, and in most cases the coefficients are statistically significant.  Despite the 
relatively small sample size, the estimation results are quite robust across specifications.   
The collateral coefficient has a positive sign in all three specifications, just as 
predicted in our model, although it is not statistically significant.  The bank managers favor 
private firms more when they view liquidation costs of seizing collateral to be lower for 
private firms. 
  Our measure of sanctioning ability, the share of firm managers native to the 
township, has the expected negative sign in all specifications and is statistically significant in 
the preferred first specification.  We recognize that omitted variables, such as community William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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characteristics that are favorable to future firm performance, could both attract outside 
managers and increase the likelihood of joint liability lending.  Other variables we tried, 
including whether managers were government leaders in the past or present, and 
characteristics of township leaders (e.g., share native to the township, turnover rate), were 
statistically insignificant and often of the wrong sign.  This suggests first, that mobility of 
firm managers is the most important factor for sustaining sanctioning ability.  Direct ties to 
the government are less important, perhaps because as long as the managers intend to stay in 
the township, their relationship with leaders is important.  Second, it is the position of 
township leaders rather than the characteristics of township leaders that facilitates 
sanctioning.  Township leaders can punish managers using their administrative authority and 
can pass on reputational knowledge to successors.   
  The share of profitable firms in the local economy has the right sign and is 
statistically significant in the first two specifications.  For the preferred first specification, a 
one percent increase in profitable enterprises decreases the probability of preferring private 
firms by 0.44 percent.  This supports the hypothesis that the fall of profitability of TVEs was 
a driving force for changing lending preferences and TVE privatization.  The coefficient has 
the wrong sign in specification 3, likely because of the endogeneity problems described 
earlier. 
The interest rate variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant in all 
specifications.  Higher interest rates increase the firms’ debt burden and make group default 
more likely. 
Bank competition increases the likelihood of preferring lending to private 
enterprises.  The coefficient for share of non-ABC/RCC loans is positive and statistically 
significant in all specifications.  For an increase of one percent of the township’s loan market 
share of financial institutions other than ABC local branches and RCCs, the probability that 
bank managers favor private borrowers increases by 0.94 percent.  When we alter the 
competition variable to include lending by ABCs for RCCs and lending by RCC’s for ABCs, 
the coefficient estimates are smaller and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the two 
institutions share information, either actively or through local informants.   
The coefficient on group size is negative as expected, statistically significant in the 
third specification and nearly so in the preferred first specification.  The larger the group 
size, the greater the ability to pool risk and the greater the likelihood of repayment.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Finally, the effects of institutional and provincial dummies are worth noting.  The 
signs are consistent in all specifications and statistically significant in almost all cases.  ABCs 
are more likely to prefer lending to private firms than RCCs.  As larger, more centralized 
financial institutions, they may have less information on the true profitability of collective 
firms and greater ability to pursue legal actions against delinquent borrowers.  In addition 
although Zhejiang is better know for private enterprise success, holding all other factors 
equal, banks in Jiangsu are more likely to prefer lending to private firms, perhaps because of 
lower expectations about the future performance of collective enterprises. 
Township Leader Involvement in Lending Activity 
We estimate probit and ordered probit models of variables that measure the 
involvement of township leaders in lending activity.  The dependent variables are whether 
township leaders organized loan application meetings in 1997 and 1994,
18 and the extent to 
which bank managers expect assistance from township leaders in loan repayment when loans 
are overdue in 1997.  Possible reponses to the latter question are 1=never, 2=occasionally, 
3=sometimes, 4=frequently, and 5=definitely.  Consistent with the decline of joint liability 
lending, the frequency of loan application meetings organized by township leaders declined 
significantly.  In 1994, 70 percent of township leaders organized loan application meetings.  
By 1997, the percentage fell to 51 percent.   
For all three dependent variables, we consider the latent variable g* to be a measure 
of the involvement of township leaders in lending to collective firms, or the importance of 
joint liability: 
 
  e a a a a a a a a + + + + + + + + = TYPE PROV n m r z s g 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 *   (2) 
 
Other than collateral, the same independent variables used in the lending preference 
equation are included, as well as control dummies for financial institution and province.  The 
collateral variable measures differences between collective and private firms, but our goal is 
to compare the involvement of township leaders in collective lending given that lending to 
collective enterprises occurs. 
                                                 
18 As described in Table 2, we also have data on the number of meetings organized by township governments 
to discuss loan repayment, but unlike the measure of expected assistance conditional on loans being overdue, 
the number of repayment meetings is endogenous to repayment performance. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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For each year, to the extent possible we include independent variables from the 
current year.  There is no endogeneity problem as for lending preferences because township 
leader involvement reflects joint liability lending among collective firms and so should 
depend on current characteristics of collective firms.  In the first specification, all variables 
are for 1997.  Unfortunately, we do not have data on competition and interest rates in 1994, 
when we expect joint liability lending to be at its strongest, so our estimate for 1994 loan 
meetings, the second specification, drops the competition and interest rate variables.  Finally, 
our third specification is an ordered probit for the likelihood that township leaders will assist 
in efforts to recover loans when loans are overdue.  Because the willingness to spend the 
time to find local leaders to help with repayment may depend on the size and quality of the 
private sector, and the expected frequency of repayment problems, in this specification we 
add additional controls—the number of private firms, the percent of private firms that are 
profitable, and the percent of borrowers with no difficulty meeting repayment.  
The empirical results for the determinants of government leader participation in 
lending are presented in Table 6, and marginals for the first specification are reported in 
Table 7.  Sanctioning ability has the expected positive and statistically significant effect on 
the strength of joint liability as measured by whether the township holds loan application 
meetings.  Results for all firm-related variables support our theory.  For all three 
specifications, townships with a larger share of profitable firms are more likely to exhibit a 
group-lending equilibrium as reflected in township leaders arranging loan application 
meetings and government leader assistance in repaying overdue loans.  This positive 
association between township leader participation in lending and firm profitability is the 
opposite of what would be expected if township leaders used political influence to support 
inefficient enterprises.  The interest rate has inconsistent signs and is not statistically 
significant.  The share of loans from financial institutions other than the RCC and ABC has 
a negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of loan application meetings 
and seeking assistance from government leaders in loan repayment.  Finally, group size has a 
significantly positive impact on government participation in lending. 
We also tried other indicators of joint liability lending described in Table 2.  When 
using the variable for whether leaders held loan repayment meetings (or the number of such 
meetings), we find that the likelihood is negatively rather than positively related to firm 
performance and that other factors are all insignificant.  We believe this reflects that unlike 
for meetings to arrange new loans, meetings to discuss repayment are strongly endogenous William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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to repayment problems related to firm performance.  In fact, one could interpret this result 
as consistent with our argument that township leaders facilitate repayment.  Other general 
measures of township leader participation in lending (such as number of visits between 
leaders and bank officials) suffer from the same endogeneity problems, since many of these 
visits may be to monitor or enforce repayment.  We also tried a specification using the 
number of loan application meetings, but almost all estimates were insignificant, suggesting 
that the number of meetings is affected by factors not adequately captured, or that the 
number of meetings matters much less than whether there are any meetings at all in 
reflecting the strength of joint liability lending.   
Who Gets Loans? 
  If lending contracts to collective enterprises are characterized by joint liability 
lending, the ability of a collective firm to obtain a loan should depend not only the firm’s 
own ability to repay, but also on the repayment ability of other collective firms in the 
township.  For private firms, or for collective firms in townships in which banks do not 
practice joint liability lending, the profitability of other collective firms should not matter, 
and if anything should reduce the chances of borrowing if local banks have limited funds 
and profitable firms crowds out lending to other firms.  Thus, testing whether the 
profitability of other collective firms in townships practicing group lending positively affects 
the ability of collective firms to borrow is a robust test for the existence of joint liability 
lending.
19 
  To implement this test empirically, we specify probit and ordered probit models for 
the likelihood of getting new loans from local banks, using data from the firm survey.  The 
sample includes both collective and private firms and uses cross-sectional data for 1997 only.  
We use two variables to measure the likelihood of receiving a loan:  an indicator variable for 
whether the firm actually obtained a new loan in 1997 from either the ABC or RCC, and a 
subjective assessment by the firm manager of whether the firm could obtain a loan from the 
ABC or RCC if the firm applied.  Here, the possible responses are 1=impossible, 
2=possible, and 3=definitely. 
  The independent variables include controls for the characteristics of the firm and the 
township that might affect the ability of firms to get loans in a commercial system without 
joint liability lending, including the firm’s ownership type and profitability, the profitability 
                                                 
19 We thank Loren Brandt for suggesting this empirical test. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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and number of other private and collective firms in the township, which is important if 
funds are rationed, the year of firm establishment, whether the firm was privatized, total 
assets, whether the firm is a subsidiary, industrial sector dummies, and provincial dummies.  
We test our hypothesis by adding an interaction term of three variables: the profitability of 
other collective firms in the township, a dummy variable for being a collective firm, and a 
dummy variable for whether the bank manager prefers collective firms versus private firms 
(bank preference).  The profitability of other collective firms should only matter if the firm is 
collective and the bank prefers lending to collective firms with joint liability.  We also add a 
similar interaction term for the firm’s own profitability, although the prediction for this 
variable is less clear.  The firm’s profitability may be less important in joint lending 
arrangements since the profitability of other firms matters more, but profitability may be 
more important if private firms secure loans through other means, such as collateral. What is 
nice about the chosen specification is that by including private as well as collective firms, the 
coefficient on the key interaction term is not subject to bias from unobserved township 
characteristics that are correlated with average firm profitability. 
  Estimation results are presented in Table 8.  The main result is that the coefficient 
on the interaction term for the profitability of other collective firms, collective firm 
ownership, and bank preference for lending to collective firms is positive and statistically 
significant in both specifications, consistent with the existence of joint liability lending.  A 
one percent increase in the percentage of other collective firms that are profitable increases 
the probability of obtaining a loan by 0.67 or 0.83 percent (depending on the measure used) 
if the firm is a collective and the local bank does not prefer lending to private firms.  We are 
unable to think of plausible alternative explanations that could explain such a result.   Other 
firm characteristics that are important to loan access include the year of establishment, firm 
assets, and the firm’s sector (not reported). 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have offered a new interpretation of the rise and fall of China’s township and 
village enterprises that focuses on the lending preferences of state banks in an environment 
of changing legal institutions, firm performance, interest rates, and financial competition.  
While having omitted discussion of many other factors that influenced institutional change, 
we believe that joint liability lending and the changing views of commercially-oriented bank William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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managers is an important element of the story that has not received adequate attention in the 
existing literature on China’s township and village enterprises and China’s financial reforms. 
A number of necessary conditions existed during much of the reform period that 
made joint liability lending profitable for banks.  These included an inability to collateralize 
loans, the unique ability of groups of collective enterprises to impose sanctions on defaulting 
group members through the authority of local government officials, successful firm 
performance in a high growth transition environment, low real interest rates, and the lack of 
financial competition.  The willingness of banks to lend to collective firms through joint 
liability contracts under these conditions was an important factor sustaining collective 
ownership and local leader involvement in lending.  However, during the mid-1990s, the 
ability to seize collateral, firm profitability, interest rates, and competition all changed in ways 
that theory suggests should undermine the relative profitability of joint liability lending 
compared to individual, collateral-based lending. 
A different interpretation of the rise and fall of TVEs, which we refer to as the 
conventional view, is that local leaders could secure bank loans for TVEs by exerting political 
influence on local bank managers, even when projects were of low quality.  When bad loans  
accumulated to reach unmanageable levels in the mid-1990s, financial reforms finally were 
instituted in a serious way under the leadership of Zhu Rongji.  Only then did bank 
managers insist on timely loan repayment and begin refusing to lend to inefficient collective 
enterprises, thus encouraging privatization.  While this conventional view does not 
contradict our story of joint liability lending, it differs in emphasis.  We recognize its validity, 
and yet we argue that it cannot explain many aspects of TVE lending that have a more 
natural interpretation in our story.   
First, the conventional view cannot explain the rise of strategic default, when firms 
that can repay don’t repay.  Only seven percent of county managers perceived a low 
willingness to repay in 1990 but over one third did so in 1997 (Table 9).  This change has a 
natural interpretation if joint liability arrangements were breaking down.  Second, it cannot 
explain a number of the empirical results, for example that the involvement of township 
leaders in loan decisions is positively, not negatively, related to firm profitability.  One would 
expect the opposite sign if agency problems were important and township leaders were 
asking bank managers to make bad loans.  Nor can the conventional view explain why the 
profitability of other collective firms increases the ability of collective firms to borrow funds.  
The conventional view also does not explain why collateral, sanctioning ability, low firm William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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profitability, high interest rates, competition, and the number of firms should affect the 
relative desirability of lending to private versus collective firms since these are environmental 
changes that affect all firms.   
Although bank managers certainly were influenced by political pressure from local 
governments, they always placed importance on loan repayment which made the returns to 
joint liability lending an important concern.  When asked to rank the relative importance of 
profitability and government policy in lending decisions in different years, as early as 1991, 
the majority of respondents felt profitability was more important or solely important (Table 
9).  In both 1994 and 1997 the importance of profitability increased, so that by 1997, not one 
respondent reports policy as being more important.  Other arguments also cast doubt on a 
simple agency story.  Lending to rural enterprises was never a policy goal of upper levels of 
government, so that pressure from above cannot explain excessive lending to TVEs.  Most 
bank branch managers (two thirds in our sample) are not from the local township, so should 
be less influenced by local leaders.  Even though local leaders participate in evaluations, it is 
the county bank branch that has the most say in appointments and promotion.  County bank 
officials report to provincial superiors and have little interest in supporting bad projects at 
the local level.  Many authors affirm that budget constraints for TVEs through the financial 
system have been much harder than for SOEs (Qian and Weingast, 1997), and in fact this is 
cited as a main reason for their success compared to SOEs.  Especially in times of credit 
tightening, many TVEs were denied credit, leading to substantial bankruptcies, a pattern 
which is not observed for SOEs (Brandt and Zhu, 2000).  If anything, during these periods 
bank managers diverted funds designated for unprofitable policy loans (for poverty 
alleviation, grain procurement) to lend profitably to rural enterprises (Oi, 1999).  In depth 
interviews reveal that when pressured by township officials to support local TVEs, bank 
managers paid close attention to firm ratings in deciding which enterprises would receive 
scarce capital in the early 1990s (Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2000).  Recent research has found that 
even state bank lending to SOEs was much more responsive to performance indicators than 
funds invested directly by governments, and this was even more true in the 1980s than in the 
1990s (Cull and Xu, 2000a and 2000b).  From an incentive standpoint, ABC and RCC bank 
managers since the late 1980s have signed annual contracts that linked bonuses to profits 
and repayment performance.
20  In 1994, bonuses were 27 percent of total income and in 
                                                 
20 ABCs established a responsibility system for credit management as early as 1985. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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1997 they increased to 42 percent.  Even when such incentives were not made explicit 
contractually, managers benefited from high revenues because such funds could be spent on 
various non-wage benefits (e.g., higher quality housing, offices, and perks for employees). 
Changing bank preferences for private firms likely created strong pressure for firm 
privatization.  In our survey, 84 percent of bank managers supported privatization in 1998, 
while only 9 percent opposed.  Most bank managers (84 percent) in our sample also agree 
that privatization improves firm performance.  A full analysis of the reasons for the 
privatization of collective enterprises is beyond the scope of this paper.  We do not consider, 
for instance, the revenue concerns of village collectives and township governments, 
incentives for asset stripping and insider payoffs, and the full range of efficiency arguments. 
While this paper has focused on rural enterprises, it is interesting to consider whether 
the rapid increase in industrial groups (or jituan) among SOEs (and TVEs) in China is related 
to strategies for accessing capital in an environment of increasing bank commericialization.  
The rise and fall of joint liability lending is an excellent example of the institutional flexibility 
and responsiveness to changing institutional realities that has characterized China’s 
economic reforms. 
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Appendix 1 
Moral Hazard  
Following Ghatak and Guinnane (1998), we assume that output can take two values: 
Y with probability p and 0 otherwise.  The borrower’s action, or effort, is also defined by p, 
which incurs disutility 0.5?p
2 where ?>0.  Borrowers are risk neutral and their actions are 
unobservable to the bank.  Taking the interest rate as given,
21 an individual borrower’s 
optimal effort is defined by the following profit maximization problem: 
  { }
g
-
= g - - =
r Y
p r Y p r p
2 5 . 0 ) ( max arg ) ( ˆ .  (A1) 
Under joint liability with a two-firm group, we assume that each borrower is liable for an 
amount c in the event that the other firm’s project fails.  Assuming that borrowers choose 
projects cooperatively, optimal effort is defined by a new maximization problem: 
  { }
c
c r Y
p p cp rp pY c r p
2
5 . 0 ) 1 ( max arg ) , ( ˆ
2
- g
- -
= g - - - - = .  (A2) 
We define the advantage of joint liability lending in reducing moral hazard as the difference 
between the borrower’s effort under joint liability and the borrower’s effort with an 
individual loan: 
 
g
-
-
- g
- -
= - = D
r Y
c
c r Y
(r) p   c r p p
2
ˆ ) , ( ˆ ˆ .  (A3) 
From this expression, it is straightforward derive comparative statics for firm profitability, Y, 
and the interest rate, r in order to prove Propositions 3 and 4: 
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p
.  (A4) 
The benefits of reducing moral hazard through joint liability lending are increasing in firm 
profitability and decreasing in the interest rate.  The interest rate acts like a tax on effort and 
so reduces the effort difference under joint liability versus individual lending. 
 
                                                 
21 Ghatak and Guinnane (1998) assume that the bank adjusts the interest rate endogenously.  In China, interest 
rates are strictly regulated.  Local branches have some discretion to adjust rates but are not permitted to offer 
multiple interest rates. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Appendix 2 
Strategic Default  
We adapt a standard model of joint liability lending and strategic default developed 
by Besley and Coate (1995) to reflect the key institutional features of lending by China’s rural 
financial institutions to township and village enterprises.  The factors we consider include 
the ability to seize collateral, the distribution of local firm performance, the interest rate, and 
financial competition. 
  First, consider the expected repayment and profits when financial institutions lend to 
individual firms.  Firm output (here, identical to profit), y, from a project financed by a one-
unit loan is drawn from a distribution F(y) and after output is realized the firm’s only 
decision is whether to repay the loan (r is the sum of the principal and interest) or 
strategically default, incurring a penalty p imposed by the bank.  The firm defaults whenever 
the repayment exceeds the penalty (r>p). 
  The penalty p includes two components—collateral (c) and the discounted value to 
the firm of maintaining access to future loans from the bank (hereafter, the dynamic incentive, 
or d).  Because of the political difficulty of seizing collective assets, collateral penalties (c) are 
greater for private firms, and also higher if legal institutions are well-developed.  We assume 
that the collateral penalty is proportional to output, since banks can make claims on output if 
loans are in default.  We make the simplifying assumption that collateral cannot be seized 
from collective enterprises (c=0).  The dynamic incentive (d) is directly proportional to firm 
output y, capturing the notion that future access to loans is more valuable to profitable 
firms; and inversely proportional to m, a measure of market competition (increasing with 
greater competition).  Assuming that banks cannot perfectly and credibly share information 
about borrowers with other financial institutions, competition increases the possibility that 
firms can obtain future loans elsewhere after defaulting on loans, undermining dynamic 
incentives.  Thus, after realizing output y, individual and collective firms will repay loans if 
the following conditions hold:  
  Collective firms 
m
y
m y d p r = = < ) , (   (A5) 
  Private firms   cy
m
y
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  With strategic default by borrowers, the bank’s expected profits from individual 
lending to collective (subscript CI) and private (subscript PI) enterprises are the following:
22 
 
  )) ( 1 ( mr F r CI - = p   (A7) 
  ￿
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We exclude individual lending to collective firms as a feasible option, but use it conceptually 
to make the derivations more intuitive. 
The difference between expected profits from individual lending to collective versus 
private firms is: 
  ￿
+
- -
+
= p - p
mc
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PI CI dy y f cy mr F
mc
mr
F r
1
0
) ( )] ( )
1
( [   (A9) 
 
This expression is negative by inspection.  Banks strictly prefer lending to individual private 
firms over individual collective firms because the ability to seize collateral increases expected 
repayment rates and reduces the loss when default occurs.   
  Next, we model the joint liability lending contract for two collective firms in the 
same township.  Following Besley and Coate (1995), each firm is granted a loan of one unit, 
and the firms use the funds to invest in projects whose returns are independent.  After 
output is realized, the total loan repayment due is 2r.  The group decides to make the full 
repayment or default and pay nothing.  Unlike for individual lending, each firm can decide to 
repay the entire loan itself if managers believe that the other firm will pay nothing, or pay 
nothing if they believe the other firm will repay on their behalf.  A two-stage game is played 
as follows.  In stage 1, each firm decides simultaneously whether to contribute its share (r) of 
the total loan repayment.  If the firms make the same decision, the agreed upon outcome 
obtains.  If they disagree, in a second stage, the firm deciding to repay decides whether it is 
willing to repay the entire 2r.   
                                                 
22 We assume that there is a positive expected return to at least some lending and ignore the one unit sunk cost 
of the loan.  We also assume that the interest rate is exogenous (discussed later) so that banks cannot 
renegotiate r after observing output.  Allowing for such renegotiation should not alter the main insights as 
expected repayment depends on firm output and penalty parameters. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Ruling out coordination failure to assume the desirable positive repayment outcome 
is achieved, the expected profit from joint liability lending to collective firms is: 
 
  } )] ( ) 2 ( [ ] ) 2 ( 1 {[
2 2 mr F mr F mr F r CJ - + - = p   (A10) 
 
Expected profit is the interest times the probability of repayment.  Repayment occurs if at 
least one firm has a high return (first term in probability) or if both firms have medium 
returns (second term).  The difference in profits from joint liability versus individual 
collective lending can be expressed as follows: 
 
  )} ( )] ( ) 2 ( [ )] 2 ( 1 )[ ( { mr F mr F mr F mr F mr F r CI CJ - - - = p - p   (A11) 
 
If we divide output into three categories (high-H, medium-M, and low-L), there are 9 
possible joint outcomes for two firms: HH, HM, HL, MH, MM, ML, LH, LM, and LL.  
When a firm’s output is low but the other firm’s output is high (HL and LH), joint liability 
lending achieves repayment when individual lending leads to default (first part of the second 
term of (7)).  However, when one firm’s output is medium and the other’s is low (ML, LM), 
joint liability lending leads to default when individual lending achieves repayment (second 
part).  Thus, joint liability lending improves repayment when the former is more likely than 
the latter, which occurs when the probability of high returns exceeds the probability of 
medium returns.   
  To generate comparative statics, we assume a uniform distribution for y on the range 
[a, b].  Our goal is to see how the relative profitability of different lending contracts responds 
to changes in the model parameters.  Profitability differences can be defined as follows:   
 
  CI CJ CJCI p - p = p D  
  PI CI CIPI p - p = p D , and  (A12) 
  CIPI CJCI PI CJ CJPI p D + p D = p - p = p D . 
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Define the output level at which collective individual and private individual firms are 
indifferent between repaying loans and defaulting to be  mr yC = and 
mc
mr
yP +
=
1
.  With a 
uniform distribution, profitability differences can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
2 ) (
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The derivative of ?pCJCI with respect to yC is: 
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It is easy to show that the relative profitability of joint liability lending increases with yC until 
3 6
3 b a b
yC <
+
= , after which it declines with yC, becoming negative when yC exceeds 
3
b
.
23  
Thus, in the range in which change occurs, a higher threshold output level yC is associated 
with a switch from group to individual lending ( 0 <
¶
p D ¶
C
CJCI
y
).  The intuition for this result 
is that with a uniform distribution, a higher yC must lead to fewer high types (those with 
types above 2yC) and more medium types.  For a fixed number of possible defaults (low 
types), this makes joint liability lending, which depends on high types, less attractive.  
However, a higher yC increases the number of low types (those below yC), so that for very 
low yC, the increased incidence of possible default increases the relative profitability of joint 
liability lending even though the gain per default decreases, accounting for the reversed sign 
of the partial at low levels of yC. 
It is obvious from (A14) that: 
 
                                                 
23 For the problem to be well-defined, we assume that b>2mr and b>3a. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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With these results, it is relatively straightforward to generate comparative statics by seeing 
how different parameters affect yC amd yP.   
 
Assume a uniform distribution for output and the penalty functions in (1), we can prove the 
following propositions: 
  
Proposition 1.  Greater collateral penalties do not affect the profitability of collective group 
versus collective individual lending and reduce the profitability of collective individual 
lending versus private lending ( 0 =
¶
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Proposition 2.  Poor firm performance, defined as a uniform decrease in the output of all 
firms, reduces the relative profitability of collective group versus collective individual lending 
and does not affect the profitability of collective individual lending versus private lending 
( 0 >
¶
p D ¶
z
CJCI , 0 =
¶
p D ¶
z
CIPI , where z is mean output). 
Proof:   Define z to be mean firm profitability, and x to be one half of the range b-a.  Then 
a=z-x and b=z+x.  Substituting x and z for a and b in the expressions for relative 
profitability yields the following: 
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The partial of   CJCI p D   with respect to z is: 
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The relative profitability of collective group versus collective individual lending decreases 
with higher mean profitability only when the average firm type is a high return firm (willing 
to pay twice the repayment amount as an individual firm).  If this is the case, then the 
probability of high types must exceed 0.5 and thus be greater than the probability of middle 
types, meaning that group lending is preferred.  Thus, in the range in which individual 
lending may overtake group lending,  0 >
¶
p D ¶
z
CJCI .  Also, by inspection,  0 >
¶
p D ¶
z
CIPI . 
 
Proposition 3.  A higher interest rate reduces the profitability of collective group versus 
collective individual lending and reduces the profitability of collective individual lending 
versus private individual lending ( 0 <
¶
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Proposition 4.  Greater bank competition reduces the profitability of collective group 
versus collective individual lending and reduces the profitability of collective individual 
lending versus private lending ( 0 <
¶
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m
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Table 1 
Rural Collective Enterprises and Financial Intermediation in China 
 
  Number of 
Enterprises 
 
Employment 
 
 Total Output 
Value 
Collective 
Share of Total 
Rural 
Enterprise 
Output  
Ratio of 
Collective to 
State-owned 
Enterprise 
Industrial 
Output Value  
Total 
Profits/ 
Total 
Revenue  
Loans 
Outstanding a 
TVE Share of 
Total Rural 
Lending  
Bank Loans/ 
Total 
Revenue  
  million  million  billion  
1997 yuan 
%    %  billion  
1997 yuan 
%  % 
                   
1985  1.9  43.3  678.4  73.7  0.23  9.4  118.8  17.2  18.8 
1986  1.7  45.4  n.a.  n.a.  0.26  6.8  169.7  21.3  24.1 
1987  1.6  47.2  n.a.  n.a.  0.30  5.6  202.7  22.5  23.4 
1988  1.6  48.9  n.a.  n.a.  0.34  4.5  204.0  23.4  19.4 
1989  1.5  47.2  1174.9  66.4  0.35  3.1  196.5  22.7  19.4 
1990  1.5  45.9  1317.6  67.4  0.37  2.7  231.6  22.0  21.7 
1991  1.4  47.7  1526.5  66.6  0.32  2.5  278.2  22.2  21.5 
1992  1.5  51.8  2185.4  66.7  0.40  2.6  348.3  23.8  18.5 
1993  1.7  57.7  3304.0  64.3  0.46  3.0  424.3  31.9  15.1 
1994  1.6  59.0  3997.9  67.6  0.68  2.1  419.2  33.2  12.8 
1995  1.6  60.6  n.a.  n.a.  0.76  1.8  430.7  33.1  12.1 
1996  1.5  59.5  n.a.  n.a.  0.97  1.7  444.8  28.3  11.8 
1997  1.3  53.3  4384.4  48.8  n.a.  1.9  409.0  22.9  10.9 
                   
 
a Bank loans only include those from the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural Credit Cooperatives.  
 
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook (1986-1998); Statistical Yearbook of Rural Financial and Banking of China (1986-1998); and China Yearbook of Township and Village Enterprises 
(1990-1998), Beijing: Agricultural Press. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Table 2 
Involvement of Local Leaders in Township-Run Enterprises
 
 
    1990  1994  1997 
         
Number of Meetings Organized by Township Governments a     
For loan granting   Obs.    103  113 
    Percentage with loan application meetings  %    69.9  51.3 
    Average number of meetings      3.7  3.0 
         
For loan repayment  Obs.    107  113 
    Percentage with loan application meetings  %    22.4  17.7 
    Average number of meetings      5.6  3.2 
         
         
Bank manager seeks assistance from govt.          
leaders once a firm has overdue loans b (N=110, %)     
    Impossible        33.6 
    Occasionally        3.6 
    Sometimes        10.0 
    Frequently        5.5 
    Always        47.3 
   
   
Government Assistance in Repaying Loans a   
Once A Collective Firm Shuts Down (N=44, %)       
    Likely    43.2  25.0  11.1 
    Possible    13.6  15.9  13.3 
    Unlikely    43.2  59.1  75.6 
     
     
Number of Visits Between Township    Obs.    53  56 
Leaders and Bank Officers a      37.4  29.3 
         
       
Loans Guaranteed by Governments c       
Number of collective borrowing firms   Obs.    130  86 
Of which, guaranteed by guarantors  %    46.2  41.9 
Of which, guaranteed by local governments   %    31.7  5.6 
                guaranteed by other collective firms     %    63.3  86.1 
         
 
a Data are from the survey of township leaders. 
b Data from bank manager survey. 
c Data from firm manager survey. 
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Table 3 
Collateralization and Liquidation Costs 
a 
 
    1994  1997 
    TVEs  PEs  TVEs  Pes 
Enterprise Loan Value           
Secured by collateral (%)  Obs.  77  19  56  55 
    30.1  6.3  45.8  52.7 
           
Secured by guarantors (%)  Obs.  77  17  56  55 
    58.6  67.4  50.1  41.8 
           
Frequency of Lawsuits against Borrowing Firms       
Number of lawsuits/number of new loans  Obs.  39  36  54  54 
(%)    0.07  0.11  0.21  0.52 
         
         
Bank Manager Views on Liquidation Costs       
    Collective 
Enterprises 
Same  Private 
Enterprises 
        1.  For which type of firm is legal action to 
seize collateral more effective? (N=84)    8.3  15.5  76.2 
         
    Very Serious  Somewhat  No 
         
2.  Is high liquidation cost a problem? (%)     70.3  2.7  27.0 
     (N=74)         
         
 
a Data in this table are from the survey of local branch managers. 
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Table 4 
Profitability of Rural Enterprises 
a 
 
  1994  1995  1996  1997 
         
1.  All Enterprises         
         
Number of firms  415  411  409  405 
Of which are profitable (%)  75.9  75.2  67.5  70.9 
Profits/production (%)  2.5  2.3  0.4  -1.7 
         
2.  Township Enterprises         
         
Total number of township enterprises  323  276  224  174 
Of which are profitable (%)  75.2  73.2  64.3  66.7 
Profits/production (%)  2.5  1.9  -0.3  -3.0 
         
For firms That Were Township Enterprises in 1994       
Number of Firms  323  318  315  310 
Of which are profitable (%)  75.2  71.1  62.2  66.8 
Profits/production (%)  2.5  1.7  -0.5  -2.5 
         
3.  Private Enterprises         
         
Total number of private enterprises  92  135  185  231 
Of which are profitable (%)  78.3  79.3  71.4  74.0 
Profits/production (%)  2.3  2.9  1.2  -0.8 
         
For firms that were Private Enterprises in 1994         
Number of firms  92  92  92  92 
Of which are profitable (%)  78.3  89.1  84.8  83.7 
Profits/production (%)  2.3  4.1  3.2  0.8 
         
Newly Privatized Firms During the Year          
Number of firms  -  42  51  47 
Of which are profitable (%)    57.1  66.7  51.1 
Profits/production (%)    0.2  -0.7  -6.6 
         
 
a Data in this table are computed based on the survey of township leaders. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of Lending Preferences 
a 
 
  Bank Managers’ Lending Preferences in 1997 
(1=collective enterprises; 2=neutral; 3=private enterprises) 
Specification  1  2  3 
       
Collateral Effectiveness in 1997       
Effectiveness of seizing collateral  0.58    0.71 
  (1.12)    (1.36) 
Sanctioning Ability  
(firm managers born in township, %) 
     
All collective firms in 1994  -2.77  -0.77   
  (-2.11)  (-0.55)   
All collective firms in 1997      -1.72 
      (-0.98) 
Profitability (share of profitable firms)       
All collective firms in 1994  -1.23  -1.72   
  (-1.76)  (-2.77)   
All collective firms in 1997      0.64 
      (1.38) 
Interest Rates in 1997       
Six-month loans (%)  103.29  91.19  76.50 
  (2.91)  (2.20)  (2.19) 
Bank Competition in 1997       
Share of loans of competing fin. Inst.  2.63  1.85  2.30 
  (2.54)  (2.03)  (2.37) 
Group Size (number of firms)       
All collective firms in 1994  -0.08  -0.03   
  (-1.69)  (-0.78)   
All collective firms in 1997      -0.006 
      (-0.10) 
       
Bank type  1.50  1.65  1.06 
(1=ABC; 0=RCC)  (1.64)  (2.11)  (1.23) 
       
Province  1.19  1.06  0.79 
(1=Jiangsu; 0=Zhejiang)  (2.84)  (2.60)  (1.73) 
       
Observations  45  60  47 
       
 
a  Estimated as an ordered probit.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.   
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Table 6 
Determinants of Government Involvement in Lending 
a 
 
  Did Township Leaders Organize 
Loan Application Meetings? b 
Likelihood that Bank 
Managers Seek Gov’t 
Assistance in Enforcing 
Loan Repayment if a 
Collective Firm has 
Overdue Loans c 
Specification  1  2  3 
       
Sanctioning Ability 
(firm managers born in township, %) 
     
All collective firms in 1997  7.90    1.78 
  (3.26)    (1.27) 
All collective firms in 1994    4.78   
    (2.25)   
  (-1.16)    (-2.62) 
Profitability (share of profitable firms)       
All collective firms in 1997  1.00    1.13 
  (1.39)    (1.20) 
All collective firms in 1994    1.97   
    (2.23)   
Interest Rates in 1997       
Six-month Loans (%)  -1.84    42.61 
  (-0.05)    (0.87) 
Bank Competition in 1997       
Share of loans of competing fin. inst.  -1.03    -1.99 
       
Group Size (number of firms)       
All collective firms in 1997  0.30    0.22 
  (2.50)    (3.33) 
All collective firms in 1994    0.12   
    (2.17)   
Bank type (1=ABC; 0=RCC)      0.71 
      (0.78) 
Province (1=Jiangsu; 0=Zhejiang)  0.21  0.25  -0.21 
  (0.43)  (0.47)  (-0.70) 
Constant  -9.12  -6.60   
  (-2.23)  (-2.47)   
       
Observations  37  38  57 
       
 
a Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
b We define the dependent variable as 1 if there were loan application meetings presided by local government 
leaders and 0 if none.  The dependent variable in specification 1 is for 1997 and in specifications 2 is for 1994.  
Estimated as a probit model. 
c  We asked local branch managers to estimated the possibility of seeking assistance from township government 
leaders once a collective firm has overdue loans.  Five categories were defined: 1=never; 2=occassionally; 
3=sometimes; 4=frequently; 5=definitely.  Estimated as an ordered probit model.  Additional controls include 
the share of private firms that are profitable, the number of private firms, and the share of firms with no 
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Table 7 
Marginal Effects  
 
  Bank Manager’s 
Lending 
Preferences 
a 
Meetings Hosted 
by Gov’t Leaders 
for Loan 
Applications b 
Likelihood to Seek 
Gov’t Assistance in 
Repaying Loans If A 
Collective Firm has 
Overdue Loans c 
  1  2  3 
       
Collateral Effectiveness in 1997       
Effectiveness of seizing collateral  0.21     
       
Bank Competition in 1997       
Share of loans of competing fin. Inst.  0.94  -0.41  -0.79 
       
Interest Rates in 1997       
Six-month loans (%)  36.95  -0.73  16.94 
       
Profitability (share of profitable firms)       
All collective firms in 1997  -0.44  0.40  0.44 
       
Sanctioning Ability  
(firm managers born in township, %) 
     
All collective firms in 1997  -0.99  3.12  0.71 
       
Group Size (number of firms)       
All collective firms in 1997  -0.03  0.12  0.09 
       
Bank type  -0.29    0.016 
(1=ABC; 0=RCC)       
       
Province  -0.19  0.08  -0.001 
(1=Jiangsu; 0=Zhejiang)       
       
 
a  The marginal effects of preferring lending to private enterprises (specification 1 in Table 6). 
b  The marginal effects of having loan application meetings (specification 1 in Table 7). 
c  The marginal effects of definitely seeking government assistance if a firm has overdue loans (specification 3 
in Table 7). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 462 
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Table 8 
Who Gets New Loans? 
a 
 
  New Loans Received in 1997 
from Either ABC Local 
Branches or RCCs 
b 
Likelihood of Approval if 
Applying for New Loans (1997) 
c 
Specification  1  2 
  Coefficients  Marginal 
Effects 
e 
Coefficients  Marginal 
Effects 
e 
         
Profit. of other coll. firms* firm   2.04  0.672  2.18  0.834 
    ownership * bank preference  (1.72)    (3.48)   
Firm profitability * firm ownership  0.80  0.263  -0.34  0.017 
    * bank preference  (1.38)    (-0.75)   
Firm ownership (1=collective;   -0.28  -0.094  -0.29  0.011 
    0=private)  (-0.77)    (0.90)   
Firm profitability  -0.26  -0.082  0.39  0.021 
  (-1.29)    (1.08)   
Profitability of other private firms  -0.47  -0.153  -0.22  -0.085 
  (-0.97)    (-0.41)   
Profitability of other collective   0.62  0.203  -0.01  -0.004 
    Firms  (1.17)    (-0.02)   
Number of other collective firms  -0.08  -0.027  -0.03  -0.013 
  (-1.30)    (-0.67)   
Number of other private firms   0.05  0.018  -0.07  -0.028 
  (1.12)    (-1.74)   
Privatized firm (1=yes; 0=no)  0.44  0.130  -0.09  0.001 
  (0.96)    (-0.20)   
Years the firm has been established  0.03  0.010  -0.03  -0.012 
  (1.81)    (-1.84)   
The firm’s total assets  0.00013  0.00004  0.00036  0.00014 
  (1.54)    (4.47)   
Whether the firm is a subsidiary   0.46  0.131  -0.76  0.110 
    (1=yes; 0=no)  (0.88)    (-1.77)   
Bank type (1=ABC; 0=RCC)      -0.47  -0.024 
      (-2.92)   
Province (1=Jiangsu; 0=Zhejiang)  -0.59  -0.194  0.33  -0.012 
  (-1.34)    (0.85)   
         
Observations  103    136   
         
 
a Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Industrial dummies (light industry, machinery and heavy industry, and 
fabric industry) are omitted. 
b Reported by firm managers where 1=received new loans in 1997 and 0=no new loans.  Estimated as a probit 
model 
c We asked firm managers to estimated the likelihood of receiving new loans if they applied by the end of 1997.   
Three categories were defined: 1=impossible; 2=likely; 3=no problem.  Estimated as an ordered probit. 
e Marginal effects measure the impact of changing independent variables on the probability of definitely 
receiving/granting loans. 
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Table 9 
Bank Lending Goals and Loan Repayment 
a 
 
  1990  1994  1997 
  Percentage 
       
Which is Important in Lending? Government Preference or Bank Profitability (N=29)   
       
1.  Government policy was solely important  6.9  3.5  0 
2.  Both were important, but government policy  
     was more important 
20.7  13.8  0 
3.  Both were equally important   13.8  17.2  3.4 
4.  Bank profitability was solely important  3.5  20.7  55.2 
5.  Both were important, but bank profitability was  
     more important 
51.7  37.9  35.5 
6.  Others  3.4  6.9  6.9 
       
       
Willingness to Repay If Able to Repay (Strategic Default) (N=29) c     
High  57.2  37.9  41.4 
Medium  35.7  41.4  24.2 
Low  7.1  20.7  34.4 
       
Rank by Year of Willing to Repay (N=25)d       
Highest  60.0  20.0  36.0 
Medium  16.0  60.0  12.0 
Lowest  24.0  20.0  52.0 
       
 
a This table is estimated by managers from ABC county branches and RCC county associations.  Local 
government leaders were asked the same questions and similar results were obtained. 
b "Actual repayment rate" is defined as the ratio of loans repaid over total loans due in the year, excluding those 
bad loans accumulated before the year of question. 
c "Willingness to repay if able to repay" is defined by whether the borrowing firms are willing to repay loans 
when they are financially capable of doing so.  We try to eliminate the effect of declining profitability of 
borrowing firms on their repayment decisions. 
d For comparison, the interviewees were asked to rank both willingness of repaying loans and the actual 
repayment rate among the years of 1990, 1994 and 1997.  
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